e Helios voting scheme is well studied including formal proofs for veri ability and ballot privacy. However, depending on its version, the scheme provides either participation privacy (hiding who participated in the election) or veri ability against malicious bulletin board (preventing election manipulation by ballot stu ng), but not both at the same time. It also does not provide receipt-freeness, thus enabling vote buying by le ing the voters construct receipts proving how they voted. Recently, an extension to Helios, further referred to as KTV-Helios, has been proposed that claims to provide these additional security properties. However, the authors of KTVHelios did not prove their claims. Our contribution is to provide formal de nitions for participation privacy and receipt-freeness that we applied to KTV-Helios. In order to evaluate the ful llment of participation privacy and receipt-freeness, we furthermore applied the existing de nition of ballot privacy, which was also used for evaluating the security of Helios, in order to show that ballot privacy also holds for KTV-Helios.
INTRODUCTION
e Helios voting scheme has been introduced in [2] and subsequently implemented and used in several real-world elections such as the IACR elections [24] . Moreover, the research conducted on Helios led to the development of several extensions for the scheme [13-15, 21, 23, 42, 48] , formal security de nitions and proofs [8, 9, 15, 30] and usability evaluations [27, 41] . Due to these numerous scienti c extensions and evaluations, the Helios scheme can be considered one of the most evolved e-voting scheme which provides ballot privacy and end-to-end veri ability. However, the current implementation of Helios does not provide veri ability against malicious bulletin board that can add or modify ballots on behalf of the voters who do not perform the necessary veri cation procedures. e extension proposed in [15] solves this issue by introducing digital signatures thus providing such veri ability against malicious bulletin board. It however, does not ensure participation privacy, meaning that the public available election data reveals whether a honest voter participated in the election or abstained. Although Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permi ed. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. ARES '17, Reggio Calabria, Italy © 2017 ACM. 978-1-4503-5257-4/17/08. . . $15.00 DOI: 10.1145/3098954.3098990 this information is usually potentially available in traditional paperbased elections, whereby anyone can observe people going into a polling station, an Internet voting system without participation privacy reveals the identities of the voters who cast their ballot in an election on a much larger scale by publishing them online. Hence, the lack of participation privacy in Internet voting is a violation of voter privacy that is more serious in comparison to paper-based elections. A further issue with voter privacy in Helios is the lack of receipt-freeness, that enables voters constructing receipts that prove to a third party which candidate the voter has voted for. us, such receipts could be used for vote buying.
Recently an extension to Helios has been proposed [31] (henceforth referred to as KTV-Helios) that adds probabilistic participation privacy and probabilistic receipt-freeness to the Helios voting scheme while, at the same time, ensuring veri ability against malicious bulletin board, assuming a reliable public-key infrastructure is in place. However, despite their conceptual contributions to the Helios scheme, the authors of [31] did not actually formally prove the security of their scheme. Furthermore, providing such proofs for KTV-Helios requires introducing new formal de nitions for participation privacy as well as receipt-freeness: Although the existing formal de nitions of ballot privacy can be extended and applied for evaluating participation privacy in some voting systems, no de nition that addresses participation privacy speci cally has been proposed, yet. e available de nitions of receipt-freeness, on the other hand, do not fully encompass the available e-voting schemes and security models that ensure receipt-freeness.
e main contributions of our paper are new formal de nitions for probabilistic participation privacy (see Section 3) and probabilistic receipt-freeness (Section 4), that we use to apply to KTV-Helios and evaluate its security claims. In order to evaluate the participation privacy and receipt-freeness of KTV-Helios we rst prove that it ensures ballot privacy according to the de nition in [8] in the random oracle model (Section 3.3.1).
verify that their vote has been encrypted correctly or to submit it to the bulletin board. During the tallying, the encrypted votes are anonymized, either via mix net shu e or homomorphic tallying. e anonymized result is jointly decrypted by the tabulation tellers and published as the outcome of the election.
e basic idea of KTV-Helios is the introduction of so-called dummy ballots that are meant to obfuscate the presence of ballots cast by the voters 2 . e dummy ballots are cast on behalf of each voter by the new type of entity, the posting trustee 3 , during the whole voting phase and are published next to that voter's name. Each dummy ballot consists of an encryption of a null vote accompanied with the well-formedness proof that is constructed in the same way as the proofs for non-dummy ballots. e well-formedness proof ensures that only the voter herself can cast non-dummy ballots. Before the tallying, for each voter the ballots that are published next to the voter's name are aggregated into the nal ballot. Due to the homomorphic property of the cryptosystem, and due to the fact that the dummy ballots contain the encryption of a null vote, this nal ballot encrypts the sum of all non-dummy votes cast by the voter. e nal ballots of all voters are being anonymized via mix net shu e. A erwards, each anonymized ballot is either assigned to a valid voting option or discarded without revealing its value.
Similar to the proposal in [15] , KTV-Helios achieves veri ability against malicious bulletin board and prevents ballot stu ng by publishing the identities of the eligible voters and using public-key infrastructure to authenticate the voters during voting. It, however, requires trusting the device that holds the private signing key of the voter. is assumption, however, might be realistically expected in some se ings, e.g. in case of a national eID infrastructure with tamper-resistant smartcards. While the discussion of veri ability in KTV-Helios is out of scope for this paper, we provide the security model and the formal proofs in the full version of our paper [19] . Futhermore, the dummy ballots in KTV-Helios serve to achieve participation privacy and receipt-freeness.
In the subsections that follow we provide a formal description of KTV-Helios with more details.
Building Blocks of KTV-Helios
In this section, we describe the building blocks (i. e. the cryptographic primitives and the probability distributions) of the KTVHelios scheme. e scheme uses the following cryptographic primitives:
• Signed ElGamal [9] , a NM-CPA secure encryption scheme (the same one is used in Helios). Its algorithms are KeyGen, Enc, Dec.
e encryption of a message m ∈ Z q with a public key ( , h) ∈ G 2 is (( r , m h r ), π P oK ) where r ←$ Z q is randomly sampled and π PoK is a Schnorr proof of knowledge of r . To decrypt a ciphertext ((c (1) , c (2) ), π P oK ) with a secret key sk, rst check the PoK and if successful set m = c (2) · (c (1) ) (−sk) .
• An existentially unforgeable digital signature scheme consisting of algorithms SigKeyGen, Sign and Verify, for example Schnorr signatures.
• e Chaum-Pedersen NIZK proof EqProof( 1 , 2 , h 1 , h 2 ) that proves the equality of discrete logarithms log 1 h 1 = log 2 h 2 as described in [11] . is proof can be simulated in the random oracle model, for which we write SimEqProof( 1 , 2 , h 1 , h 2 ) (see e. g. [8] ).
• A NIZK disjunctive proof DisjProof(pk id , sk id ∈ {sk id , 0}, 1 ,
2 , h 1 , h 2 , t) that given (pk id , sk id ) ←$ SigKeyGen and 1 , 2 , h 1 , h 2 ∈ G q and timestamp t proves either the knowledge of s = Sign(sk s , 1 || 2 ||h 1 ||h 2 ||t) 4 , or the equality of discrete logarithms log
• A re-encryption mix-net for ElGamal ciphertexts Mix(c 1 , ..., c N ), for example the one of Wikström and Terelius [47] .
• A plaintext equivalence test (PET) to decrypt ElGamal ciphertexts. On input a ciphertext c, a secret key sk and a message m it creates a decryption factor d that is 1 if c is an encryption of m under sk and random in Z q if not. It also creates a proof π P ET that it operated correctly (this is another Chaum-Pedersen EqProof).
e next building blocks are the probability distributions. ey are used by the posting trustees in order to cast a random number of dummy ballots at random times next to each voter's id. In order to specify the dummy ballot casting algorithm for the posting trustee, we use two probability distributions P d and P t . e rst probability distribution P d is used to sample a number of dummy ballots for each voter.
is distribution therefore has a support [x, ] with x, as the minimal and maximal number of dummy ballots that the posting trustee is going to cast for each voter (i. e., x ∈ N 0 , ∈ N 0 ∪ {∞}). e parameters x and , as well as the exact P d needs to be de ned by the election authorities when se ing up a corresponding system, i. e. their optimal trade-o between security and e ciency 5 . e second probability distribution P t is used to determine the time to cast each dummy ballot. us, this distribution has a support [T s ,T e ] with T s denoting the timestamp at the start of the voting phase and T e the timestamp at the end of the voting phase. In order to obfuscate the ballots cast by voters, P t should resemble the distribution of times at which the voters cast their ballots. For this, e. g. the information from the previous elections could be used.
Formal Description of KTV-Helios
We are now ready to provide the formal description of the KTVHelios scheme. is description is based upon the syntax proposed in [8] , adjusted to the context of the KTV-Helios scheme. For the sake of simplicity, we assume a single tabulation teller and a single posting trustee 6 . We rst specify the various functions in place, i.e.:
• RegisterVoter(1 λ , id) is run by the voter id. e voter id generates a pair of keys (pk id , sk id ) ←$ SigKeyGen(1 λ ) and sends the public key pk id to the registration authority. 4 Methods for proving the knowledge of a digital signatures via Σ-proof are described by Asokan et al. [4] for common signature schemes; the general method of constructing NIZK disjunctive proofs is described by Cramer et al. in [18] . 5 We provide further information on how the choice of P d a ects the security of the scheme in Sections 3 and 4. 6 We discuss extending the proofs towards several of those entities in the full version of our paper [19] .
• RegisterRA(1 λ , id, pk id ) is run by the registration authority. e registration authority adds (id, pk id ) to the list of registered voters' public keys I pk if id ∈ I , and returns ⊥ otherwise.
• Setup(1 λ ) is run by the tabulation teller. It runs (pk, sk) = KeyGen to create the election keys and returns the public key pk.
• Vote((id , sk id ), id, , t) creates a ballot b = (id, c, π PoK , π , t) for voter id ∈ I and voting option that is cast at a timestamp 7 t. If id = id (a voter casting her own ballot) then it computes (c, π PoK ) = Enc(pk, ) where c = (c (1) , c (2) ) and π = DisjProof(pk id , sk id , , h, c (1) , c (2) , t) using a signature Sign(sk id , ||h||c ||t). If id =î d (the posting trustee is casting a ballot on behalf of voter id) then sk id is not required but must be 0. Note that the challenges used in π PoK and π should include the statements and commitments from both π P oK and π in order to prevent that the voter signs and casts the ballot she did not compute herself.
• Validate(b) parses the ballot b as (id, c = (c (1) , c (2) ), π PoK , π , t) and returns 1 if π and π P oK are valid proofs, id ∈ I and t ∈ [T s ,T e ], and ⊥ otherwise.
• VerifyVote(BB, b) is used by the voter to ensure that her ballot b is properly stored on the bulletin board. It outputs 1 if b ∈ BB and ValidateBB(BB) holds, otherwise ⊥.
• VoteDummy(id) is used by the posting trustee to cast dummy ballots for a given voter id.
e posting trustee samples a random number m ←$ P d and random timestamps t 1 , ..., t m ←$ P t , and returns a set of ballots
• Valid(BB, b) is run by the board before appending a new ballot. It checks that Validate(b) = 1 and that the ciphertext c in b does not appear in any ballot already on the board. If this holds it returns 1, otherwise ⊥.
• ValidateBB(BB) checks that a board is valid. It is run by the tabulation teller as part of the tallying process and by voters verifying the board. It creates an empty board B and for each ballot b ∈ BB runs "if Valid(B , b) then append b to B ". If any ballot gets rejected it returns ⊥, otherwise 1.
• Tally(BB, sk) is used by the tabulation teller to calculate the election result. It returns a tuple (R, Π) where R is the election result and Π is auxiliary data (proofs of correct tallying). In more detail:
(1) Run ValidateBB(BB) and return ⊥ if this fails. (2) Parse each ballot b ∈ BB as (id, c, π P oK , π , t). V al id , use the PET to create a decryption factor d i, and proof π P ET ,i, . (6) e result R is the number of votes for each voting option, i. e. R( ) = |{i : d i, = 1}| for all ∈ V al id . e auxiliary data Π contains the mixing proofs π mix , the mixed ciphertexts (c 1 , . . . ,c N ), the decryption factors d i, and the PET proofs π P ET ,i, for i ∈ {1, . . . , N } and ∈ V alid .
• ValidateTally(BB, (R, Π)) takes a bulletin board BB and the output (R, Π) of Tally and returns 1 if ValidateBB(BB) = 1 and all the proofs π mix and π P ET are valid, otherwise ⊥. It is used to verify an election.
ese functions are combined in order to build the KTV Helios scheme. e corresponding description of the KTV Helios scheme is given in the following paragraphs along the line of the three phases of an election.
Setup phase: e election organizers set up an empty bulletin board BB and publish a set of valid non-null voting options V alid = ( 1 , ..., L ) with 0 ∈ V alid . If there is no existing PKI encompassing the eligible voters, the eligible voters from the voting register I register themselves by running RegisterVoter(1 λ , id). A er the voters have registered, or if there is an existing PKI already established among the voters, the registration authority prepares the list of the eligible voters' public keys by running RegisterRA(id, pk id ) for each voter id and publishing the list I pk = {(id 1 , pk id 1 ), ..., (id N , pk id N )}. e tabulation teller runs Setup(1 λ ).
Voting phase: e posting trustee runs VoteDummy(id) for each registered eligible voter id ∈ I . e posting trustee then submits each resulting dummy ballot b = (id, c, π PoK , π , t) to the bulletin board at a time corresponding to the timestamp t. e bulletin board appends b to BB. e voter id runs Vote((id, sk id ), id, , t) in order to cast her ballot for a voting option at a time denoted by timestamp t. e bulletin board appends b to BB. e voter can run VerifyVote(BB, b) to check whether her ballot is properly stored.
Tallying phase: e tabulation teller runs Tally(BB, sk) on the contents of the bulletin board, and publishes the resulting output (R, Π). Everyone who wants to verify the correctness of the tally runs ValidateTally(BB, (R, Π)).
PARTICIPATION PRIVACY
In this section we provide a general de nition of participation privacy and apply to KTV-Helios.
De ning (δ, k)-Participation Privacy
We rst describe the idea and the intuition behind our de nition, followed by the de nition itself.
Definition Idea.
Since one may consider participation privacy an extension of vote privacy, seeing abstention as one of the possible voting options, we decided to consider modifying an existing de nition of vote privacy for de ning participation privacy. As such, our de nition of participation privacy is inspired by the idea of vote swapping that has been used, in particular, in [6] to provide a game-based de nition of vote privacy. e vote swapping approach considers two voters, id 0 and id 1 and two di erent votes 0 and 1 , so that the adversary has to distinguish between the election where id 0 votes for 0 and id 1 votes for 1 , or vice versa. While more advanced de nitions for vote privacy have been developed (see [8] for an overview), the concepts that they use would not be suitable for de ning participation privacy, since the techniques that obfuscate the content of the ballot (i.e. encryption) are generally di erent from the techniques that obfuscate the identities of the voters who cast their ballots. Hence, based on the vote swapping idea, we consider voter swapping in our de nition: given two voters id 0 , id 1 , the adversary should be unable to distinguish whether id 0 has abstained and id 1 participated in the election, or vice versa.
According to our de nition, a voting system that reveals nothing but the number of voters who participated in the election and the election result ensures participation privacy. Note that such a scenario is o en the case in practice, in both Internet voting and traditional elections. While other voting systems might either refuse to publish anything but the name of the winner, or encode the votes in such a way, that the presentation of the nal result does not reveal the number of the voters who cast their ballot, these systems are out of scope of this work.
In order to enable the evaluation of participation privacy in KTV-Helios, we propose a quantitative de nition, inspired by the coercion resistance de nition in [34] and the veri ability de nition in [16] . Similar to the notion of (γ k , δ )-veri ability with quantitative goal γ k in [16] , we speak of (δ, k)-participation privacy, where δ denotes the advantage of the adversary who tries to tell whether a given voter has abstained from casting her ballot in the election, or cast her ballot at most k times. given the adversary A ∈ C S , so that C S is a set of PPT adversaries, de ned according the adversarial model for a particular scheme. ere are two bulletin boards BB 0 , BB 1 that are set up by the challenger. e adversary only sees the public output for one of these bulletin boards BB β , β ←$ {0, 1}. Let Q S be a set of oracle queries which the adversary has access to.
Using these queries, the adversary lls both of the bulletin boards with additional content modeling the voting, so that BB 0 and BB 1 contain the same cast ballots except for the ballots for the voters id 0 , id 1 : given a number of voting options 1 , ..., k chosen by the adversary, k ≤ k, for each i = 0, 1, the bulletin board BB i contains the votes for 1 , ..., k on behalf of id i and an abstention from the election is modeled for the voter id 1−i .
e oracle computes the tally result R on BB 0 . In case a voting scheme provides auxiliary output Π for the tally, the oracle returns (R, Π) in case β = 0, and simulates the auxiliary output Π = SimProof(BB 1 , R), returning the tuple (R, Π ) in case β = 1 8 .
e oracle further outputs the public content of BB β to the adversary. e goal of the adversary is to guess whether the provided output corresponds to BB 0 or to BB 1 , i.e. to guess β.
e de nition of (δ, k)-participation privacy is then as follows:
De nition 3.1. e voting scheme S achieves (δ, k)-participation privacy given a subset of PPT adversaries C S , if for any adversary A ∈ C S , k ∈ N and two honest voter id 0 , id 1 holds
is negligible in the security parameter. 8 e tally result should be the same, if the vote of each voter is equally included in the result. However, in order to be able to model the voting schemes where the weight of the vote might depend on the voter's identity, we chose to simulate the auxiliary output in our de nition.
Instantiating (δ, k)-Participation Privacy in the KTV-Helios Scheme:
In order to evaluate (δ, k)-participation privacy in the KTV-Helios scheme according to the aforementioned de nition, we rst need to specify the adversary A ∈ C S we aim to protect against. We make following assumptions regarding adversarial capabilities: the tabulation teller is trustworthy, both the voting and the veri cation device are trustworthy, the adversary does not observe the communication channel between the voter, the posting trustee and the voting system, the posting trustee is trustworthy, the bulletin board with which the voter communicates is trustworthy, the honest voters (aside from id 0 and id 1 in Exp ppriv, β A, S,k ) decide to participate or to abstain in the election independently from each other, the adversary is computationally restricted and the voters are not actively trying to prove that they abstained due to coercion.
We de ne C S as a set of adversaries that are given access to the queries Q S = {OCast, OVoteAbstain, OVoteLR, OTally} in the experiment Exp ppriv, β A, S,k . ese queries are de ned as follows:
e adversary may query OTally and OVoteAbstain only once.
Proving (δ, k)-participation privacy for KTV-Helios
We further use the de nition of (δ, k)-participation privacy and its instantiation for KTV-Helios for the evaluation of participation privacy. Namely, given k ballots, our goal is to nd δ , so that KTVHelios satis es (δ, k)-participation privacy against an adversary with access to the queries in Q S . In this we proceed as follows. First, we consider the fact that the participation privacy in KTVHelios relies on the inability of the adversary to distinguish between dummy ballots and non-dummy ballots cast by the voters. Hence, as the dummy ballots encrypt a null-vote, as opposed to non-dummy ballots, the participation privacy is strongly connected to the ballot privacy in KTV-Helios. erefore, we rst de ne and prove the ful llment of ballot privacy in KTV-Helios in Section 3.3.1. A erwards, we consider further sources of information that can be used by the adversary to win Exp ppriv, β A, S,k , namely, the number of ballots near the voters name. Finally, we determine the value of δ so that KTV-Helios ensures (δ, k)-participation privacy for a given k and provide a corresponding proof.
3.3.1 Ballot Privacy. We show that KTV-Helios has ballot privacy and two auxiliary properties called strong correctness and strong consistency in the sense of [8] . Ballot privacy is the property that an adversary cannot learn more from the election data than from the election result alone. Here the adversary may be an observer or a coalition of a subset of voters and the election data is the bulletin board with voters' ballots and any auxiliary data published by the election o cials such as proofs of correct tallying. We assume as in [8] that both the tabulation teller and the bulletin board that the voter communicates with are trustworthy, the voting device does not leak private information and the adversary is computationally restricted.
e ballot pricacy (BPRIV) notion in [8] is a security experiment with two bulletin boards, one of which (chosen at random by sampling a bit β) is shown to the adversary. For each voter, the adversary may either cast a ballot themselves or ask the voter to cast one of two votes 0 , 1 of the adversary's choice. In this case a ballot for 0 is sent to the rst board and a ballot for 1 is sent to the second board. e adversary thus sees either a ballot for 0 or a ballot for 1 ; in a scheme with privacy a PPT adversary must be unable to distinguish the two cases with more than a negligible advantage 9 .
Further, the adversary can close the election and ask for the result. Here we cannot simply tally the visible board as the results on the two boards may di er which would trivially let the adversary distinguish. Instead, [8] says that the adversary shall always see the result for the rst board. If the rst board is the visible one, the experiment tallies it normally; if the second board is visible then the experiment tallies the rst board to get the election result and provides simulated election data (e. g. proofs of correct tallying) to make it seem that the second board (which the adversary can see) tallies to the result of the rst board. A scheme is BPRIV secure if there is an algorithm SimTally that can provide simulated election data such that no PPT (probabilistic polynomial time) adversary can guess be er than at random whether they saw the rst or the second board in this experiment. We give the BPRIV experiment with minor syntax adjustments, e. g. our Vote algorithm takes a voter private signing key and a timestamp too.
De nition 3.2.
A voting scheme S has ballot privacy (BPRIV) if there is a PPT algorithm SimProof such that for every PPT adversary A the following quantity is negligible in the security parameter Where the BPRIV experiment is de ned as follows and BB β is visible to A 9 To be precise, the adversary outputs a guess for β and the probability that = β must not be more than 1/2 + ε for some negligible ε . KTV-Helios has ballot privacy. Since KTV decrypts ballots with PETs, the ballot privacy proof is actually easier than for existing Helios. e SimTally algorithm checks the board, sums the ballots for each voter and mixes them just like Tally. e result R that SimTally takes as input shows how many votes it needs to simulate for each valid choice ∈ V so it makes a list L containing a random permutation of these votes. It then produces simulated decryption factors d i, j which are 1 if L[i] = j and random in Z q otherwise. Here i ranges over the ballots output by the mix and j ranges over votes ∈ V . Since the encryption scheme is NM-CPA, a PPT adversary cannot tell real from simulated decryption factors.
e EqProof proofs for the PET are Chaum-Pedersen proofs which SimTally can simulate (in the random oracle model) for any inputs.
e full proof is provided in the full version of our paper [19] . Strong correctness and strong consistency. ese two properties from [8] prevent an adversary from breaking privacy by encoding instructions in its own ballots on the board. Strong correctness requires that an adversary cannot manipulate the board such that the board would reject honest ballots and strong consistency ensures that ballots are independent in the sense that one ballot (cast by the adversary) cannot in uence how another ballot (from a honest voter) is counted.
For both security games we need to make minor syntactical changes to include e.g. timestamps in ballots. e proofs of both properties are then routine and reduce to observing that (1) ballotweeding with Validate and Valid do not use the private election key, so they cannot depend on the votes encrypted in the ballots and (2) the tallying algorithm works correctly. e full proofs are again in the full version of our paper [19] .
Number of Ballots.
One source of information that can be used by the adversary to win in Exp ppriv, β A, S,k are the k ≤ k additional ballots on BB 1 as the output of OVoteAbstain. In order to account for the adversarial advantage gained from this number, we de ne the following experiment Exp num, β A,P d ,P t ,k : the challenger chooses a random β ∈ 0, 1. She then outputs two numbers m 0 , m 1 , so that m β = m + k , with m ←$ P d , and m 1−β ←$ P d . e oracle additionally returns the set of timestamps t 1 , ..., t m 0 +m 1 that are independently sampled from P t to the adversary. Hence, the experiment models the number of ballots next to id 0 , id 1 in the election in which the voter id 1−β abstains and the voter id β casts k ballots. e adversary has to guess β. Let δ num k,P d ,P t denote an advantage in this experiment, so that |Pr Exp
Determining the Optimal Value for δ .
We are now ready to determine an optimal value δ , so that the KTV-scheme achieves (δ, k)-participation privacy, but does not achieve (δ , k)-participation privacy for any lower values of δ . T 3.3. KTV-Helios, instantiated with the probability distributions P d , P t achieves (δ, k)-participation privacy for a given k > 0 given the subset of adversaries C S , with δ = max k ≤k δ num k ,P d ,P t . It further does not achieve (δ , k)-participation privacy for any δ < δ .
We base our proof on the idea that the the number of ballots next to id 0 and id 1 is the only thing that give advantage to the adversary. e rest of the public election data does not provide any advantage to the adversary. Our proof strategy is as follows. We consider a sequence of games that starts from Exp and show that the adversary A with the access to the queries in Q S distinguishes the transition through all those games with the advantage of at most δ := max k ≤k δ num k ,P d ,P t . We de ne BB 0,i as the content of the bulletin board and (R i , Π i ) as the tally output at the end of the game G i , i = 1, ..., 4. e game sequence is as follows:
• G 1 . e rst game G 1 is equivalent to the experiment Exp ppriv, β A, S,k with β = 0, and 1 , ..., k = 0 (hence, it is equivalent to the election where the voter id 0 abstains, and the voter id 1 casts k ≤ k ballots with the votes 1 , ..., k ). us, the content of BB 0,1 and the tally output (R 1 , Π 1 ) correspond to the content of BB 0 and the output of OTally at the end of Exp
e second game G 2 is equivalent to the election, where the voter id 0 abstains, and the voter id 1 casts k ≤ k ballots with null-votes. e contents of the bulletin board BB 0,2 is equivalent to the content of the bulletin board BB 1 at the end of Exp ppriv,1 A, S,k for the adversary using the query OVoteAbstain( 1 , ..., k ) with l = 0 ∀l = 1, ..., k . e tally result R, however, is calculated on the contents of the bulletin board BB 0,1 in the game G 1 , and the auxiliary output Π 2 is simulated as Π 2 = SimProof(R 1 , BB 0,2 ).
We prove, that the adversarial advantage in distinguishing between the output of G 1 and G 2 is at most the adversarial advantage in the ballot privacy experiment (Section 3. , 0) , id i , 0, t j ), j = 1, ..., m i . A wewards, she simulates casting the votes 1 , ..., k : For each of the votes l , l = 1, ..., k , she uses the query OVoteLR(id 1 , id 1 , 0, l , t) for a random t l ∈ P t in Exp . us, it follows that the adversarial advantage in distinguishing G 1 from G 2 is at most equal to the adversarial advantage in Exp bpriv, β A, S , denoted as δ BP RIV .
• G 3 .
e third game G 3 is equivalent to the election, where the voter id 0 casts k ≤ k ballots with null-vote, and the voter id 1 abstains from the election. Namely, the content of the bulletin board BB 0,3 is equivalent to the content of the bulletin board BB 1 at the end of Exp ppriv,1 A, S,k for the adversary using the query OVoteAbstain( 1 , ..., k ) with l = 0 ∀l = 1, ..., k , k ≤ k. e tally outputs the result R 1 computed on BB 0,1 and simulated auxilary data Π 3 = SimProof (R2, BB 0,3 ) .
We prove, that the adversary has an advantage of max k ≤k δ num
of distinguishing between the output of G 2 and G 3 . e tally result does not change, hence the tally output (R 1 , Π 2 ) is equivalent to the tally output (R 1 , Π 3 ). e only di erence between the contents of BB 0,1 and BB 0,2 is the presence of k additional ballots with the encryption of 0 on BB 0,3 . erefore, we conclude that the challenge in distinguishing between the outputs of G 2 and G 3 is equivalent to the challenge in distinguishing between the output of Exp num,0 A,P d ,P t ,k and Exp
for every k ≤ k chosen by the adversary, and therefore the adversarial advantage of distinguishing between the output of G 1 and G 2 is at most max k ≤k δ num
e fourth game G 4 is equivalent to the election where the voter id 0 casts k ballots with the votes 1 , ..., k , and the voter id 1 abstains.
e tally is computed on BB 0,1 , and the auxiliary output is simulated as Π 4 = SimProof(R 1 , BB 0,4 ). Following the argument for the indistinguishability of G 1 and G 2 , it holds that adversary distinghuishes between the outputs of G 3 and G 3 with the same advantage δ BP RIV as in the ballot privacy experiment.
It follows, that the in transition through the game sequence with the advantage only negligibly larger than δ num k,P d ,P t for each k < k that she chooses in the experiment. us, given that an adversary chooses k so that δ num
is negligibly larger than δ k := max k ≤k δ num
We provide an example of how to quantify (δ, k)-participation privacy given a particular distribution for the number of dummy ballots P d . Let P d be a geometric distribution with the parameter p ∈ (0, 1], so that the probability Pr[X = m ] = (1 − p) m p for m ≥ 0 and Pr[X = m ] = 0 for m < 0. Since the probability distribution for times of casting the dummy ballots corresponds to the distribution of times at which the voters cast their ballots, the timestamps on the ballots do not provide any additional information to the adversary. Hence, we only consider the adversary seeing the total number of cast ballots next to the voter.
Let k > 0, M c ⊂ N 2 0 be a set of all pairs (m 0 , m 1 ) output in Exp num, β A,k , for which an adversary guesses β = 0 (i.e. that m 0 = m + k with m ←$ P d , m 1 ←$ P d . It holds for δ num k,P d ,P t as de ned in Section 3.1.2:
. us, the KTV-Helios scheme with P d as a geometric distribution with parameter p achieves (δ, k)-participation privacy with δ = 1 − (1 − p) k .
RECEIPT-FREENESS
In this section we provide the de nition for δ -receipt-freeness for deniable vote updating and apply it to evaluate KTV-Helios.
De ning δ -Receipt-Freeness
As in Section 3, we start with describing the idea and the intuition behind our de nition, and then provide the de nition itself.
Definition
Idea. e KTV-Helios scheme ensures probabilistic receipt-freeness via deniable vote updating. e principle of deniable vote updating has also been proposed in other e-voting schemes [1, 36, 37] in order to prevent a voter from constructing receipts that show how the voter has voted. As such, the voter can cast her ballot for the voting option the adversary instructs to vote for, but due to deniable vote updating the voter can change her vote without the adversary knowing it. e variant of deniable vote updating used in KTV-Helios is also characterized by enabling the so-called preliminary deniable vote updating. Given two ballots b A , b , with b A as the ballot with the vote for a candidate demanded by the adversary, and b the ballot that "updates" b A to a vote for a candidate chosen by the voter, the voter can cast b A and b in any order. is approach prevents an a ack, where the voter succeeds to cast b A as the last ballot in the election, ensuring that her vote has not been updated. However, in KTV-Helios, constructing b requires the knowledge of a vote that was cast with b A .
We propose a formal de nition for probabilistic receipt-freeness for e-voting schemes with deniable vote updating. Our de nition is inspired by the de nition of coercion resistance by Kuesters et al. in [34] and the de nition of receipt-freeness by Cortier et al. [10, 13] . As such, we introduce a game-based de nition based on [13] and modi ed for the support of deniable vote updating. Similar to [34] , we employ the δ -notation in order to denote an adversarial advantage δ in nding out whether the voter indeed voted as instructed by the adversary, or whether she faked the receipt and voted for another voting option. Furthermore, similar to [34] , we consider vote buying from a single voter, while considering an extension towards multiple voters in future work.
Note that the de nition in [10, 13] argues that the receipt-freeness should not rely on the actions of the voter, the so-called "counterstrategy", that the voter should apply in order to fake her receipt while still voting how she wants to. However, previous research on receipt-freeness (see e.g. [32] ) also considers a di erent approach on whether receipt-freeness should include counter-strategies or not. Hence, we agree that our de nition describes a weaker version of receipt-freeness, which is ensured in KTV-Helios and other schemes that rely on deniable vote updating.
Intuitively, the de nition encompasses the scenario of vote selling, whereby the adversary tells the voter the name of the candidate the voter has to provide a receipt for, and the voter is able to access the randomness used in creating an adversarial ballot b A . It, however, does not cover the scenarios where the adversary wants to make sure the voter did not cast a valid vote in the election, or to change the voter's vote to a random candidate (forced abstention and randomization as described in [26] ). It also does not consider the information leakage from the election result.
4.1.2
Definition of δ -Receipt-Freeness. We adjust the de nition by Cortier et al. by enabling the voter to apply a counter-strategy against an adversary that demands a receipt, namely, to deniably update her vote. e receipt-freeness in our de nition relies on the existence of following algorithms:
• DeniablyUpdate(id, sk id , 0 , 1 , t ) as the function for casting a ballot that changes the vote of the voter id from 0 to 1 . e function further takes as input the voter's private signing key sk id and the timestamp at which the updating ballot is cast.
• Obfuscate(id) as the function used by the voting system for hiding the presence of ballots cast by the voter id for the purpose of deniable vote updating.
• SimProof(BB, R) as the function for simulating the proof of correct tallying given the ballots published on the bulletin board BB and the tally result R.
We de ne an experiment Exp rfree, β A, S for a voting scheme S as follows. e challenger sets up two bulletin boards BB 0 , BB 1 by running the setup as described Section 2.2 and randomly chooses β ∈ {0, 1}, so that the adversary only sees BB β . e adversary has access to the following queries:
OTally():
if β = 0 then return Tally(sk, BB 0 ) else (R, Π) = Tally(sk, BB 0 ) Π = SimTally(BB 1 , R) endif return (R, Π ) e oracle also lls both of the bulletin boards with the content on behalf of honest voters and honest voting system entities. At the end of an experiment, the adversary outputs her guess for β.
We now de ne δ -receipt-freeness for deniable vote updating: 
Instantiating δ -Receipt-Freeness in KTV-Helios
We accept following assumptions on adversarial capabilities for receipt-freeness in KTV-Helios: the tabulation teller is trustworthy, both the voting and the veri cation devices are trustworthy, the adversary does not observe the communication channel between the voter, the posting trustees and the voting system, the posting trustee is trustworthy, the bulletin board with which the voter communicates is trustworthy, the adversary is computationally restricted, the voter can cast a ballot without being observed by the adversary and the voters who are required by the adversary to provide receipts act independent from each other. In order to evaluate δ -receipt-freeness for the KTV-Helios scheme, we de ne the algorithms in Exp rfree, β A, S as follows:
• DeniablyUpdate(id, sk id , 0 , 1 , t ) as casting a ballot for 1 − 0 : that is, DeniablyUpdate(id, sk id , 0 , 1 , t ) = Vote((id, sk id ), id, 1 − 0 , t )
• Obfuscate(id) as casting a random number of dummy ballots distributed according to P d , P t : that is, Obfuscate(id) = VoteDummy(id)
• SimProof as simulating a proof as described in Section 3.3.1.
Proving δ -Receipt-Freeness for KTV-Helios
In order to nd an appropriate value of δ , so that we can show that KTV-Helios achieves δ -receipt-freeness, we need to account for the adversarial advantage gained from the number of ballots next to voter's id on the bulletin board. For this purpose, we de ne the following experiment Exp rfnum, β A,P d ,P t : e challenger chooses a random β {0, 1} and outputs the number m + β, with m ←$ P d , and the set of timestamps t 1 , ..., t m+β that are independently sampled from P t to the adversary. e adversary has to guess β. Hence, the experiment models the voter either obeying the adversary's instructions (for β = 0) or casting an additional ballot (for β = 1), whereby the adversary only has access to the number of ballots and their timestamps, but not to the ballots themselves. Let δ rfnum P d ,P t denote an advantage in this experiment, so that
KTV-Helios, instantiated with probability distributions P d , P t , achieves δ -receipt-freeness given the algorithms SimProof, DeniablyUpdate, Obfuscate, with δ = δ rfnum
. It further does not achieve δ -receipt-freeness for any δ < δ .
We base our proof on the idea, that the number of ballots next to the voter is the only source of information that gives advantage to the adversary. We consider a sequence of games, starting from Exp rfree,0 A and ending with Exp rfree,1 A and show, that the adversary A distinguishes the transition through all those games with the advantage of at most δ rfnum P d ,P t . We de ne BB 0,i as the content of the bulletin board and (R i , Π i ) as the tally output at the end of the game G i , i = 1, ..., 4. We de ne the sequence as follows:
• G 1 . e rst game G 1 is equivalent to the experiment Exp rfree, β A with β = 0 (hence, it is equivalent to the election where the voter id does not try to deniably update her vote). us, the content of BB 0,1 and the tally output (R 1 , Π 1 ) correspond to the content of BB 0 and the output of OTally at the end of Exp
e second game G 2 is equivalent to the election, where the voter id casts an additional ballot with a null-vote. us, the content of the bulletin board BB 0,2 is equivalent to the content of the bulletin board BB 1 at the end of Exp rfree,1 A for the adversary using the query OReceipt(id, 0 , 1 , t) with 0 = 1 .
We prove, that the adversary has an advantage of δ num of distinguishing between the output of G 1 and G 2 . e tally result does not change, hence the tally output (R 2 , Π 2 ) is equivalent to the tally output (R 1 , Π 1 ). e only di erence between the contents of BB 0,1 and BB 0,2 are the ballots next to id. Namely, G 1 contains only the ballot b A and m dummy ballots b 1 , ..., b m generated by the function VoteDummy(id) next to id, with m ←$ P d and the timestamps for the ballots b 1 , ..., b m randomly sampled from P t . As for the second game, in addition to the ballots b A , b 1 , ..., b m , the bulletin board BB 0,2 further contains an additional non-dummy (i.e. cast by the voter, not by a posting trustee) ballot b = Vote((id, sk id ), id, 0, t ) cast by the voter at a random timestamp t ←$ P t . As b , as well as b 1 , ..., b m , contains an encryption of 0, and due to the zeroknowledge property of the disjunctive proof π a ached to both dummy and non-dummy ballots, it holds that b is indistinguishable from the dummy ballots b i , ..., b m . Furthermore, the timestamp a ached to b is randomly sampled from the same distribution P t as the timestamps for the dummy ballots b 1 , ..., b m . Hence, the number of the ballots next to id remains the only source of information that the adversary can use to gain advantage in distinguishing between G 1 and G 2 . It therefore follows, that in order to distinguish between G 1 and G 2 , the adversary has to distinguish, given the number of ballots m , whether m was sampled from P d (in which case the adversary is in G 1 ), or m = m + 1 with m ←$ P d (in which case there is an additional non-dummy ballot, and the adversary is in G 2 ). is distinction corresponds to the de nition of the experiment Exp rfnum, β A,P d ,P t . erefore, we conclude that distinguishing between the outputs of G 1 and G 2 is equivalent to distinguishing between the output of Exp rfnum,0 A,P d ,P t and Exp rfnum,1 A,P d ,P t , and therefore the adversarial advantage of distinguishing between the output of G 1 and G 2 is δ rfnum
e third game G 3 is equivalent to the election, where the voter cast a vote for a non-null voting option = 0, and the tally result R is calculated on the bulletin board BB 0,2 with simulated tally proof Π = SimProof(BB 0,3 , R).
We now prove, that the adversarial advantage in distinguishing between the output of G 2 and G 3 is negligible. Consider an adversary B in the ballot privacy experiment Exp bpriv, β A, S who simulates the games G 2 and G 3 for the adversary A. e adversary B returns the output of Exp bpriv, β A for the queries OVoteLR, OTally. For simulating the output of OReceipt (id, 0 , 1 , t) , B proceeds as follows: rst, she computes a ballot b = Vote((id, sk id ), id, 0 , t). She then chooses a random value m ←$ P d , and a set of and random timestamps t 1 , ..., t m ←$ P t , and computes a set of ballots b 1 , ..., b m with b i = Vote ((î d, 0) , id, 0, t i ). She then uses the query OVoteLR(id, id, 0, 1 / 0 , t ) for a random t ∈ P t in Exp e value of δ rfnum P d ,P t can be calculated similar to δ num k,P d ,P t in Section 3. We provide an example for δ rfnum P d ,P t for some choices of P d and P t in the full version of our paper [19] .
RELATED WORK
Several de nitions of security requirements in electronic voting and underlying assumptions have been developed. An overview of game-based ballot privacy de nitions was proposed in [8] , and a framework that proposes a uniform treatment of the veri ability definitions from [7, 15, 28, 33, 44] is described in [17] . Other approaches for de ning and evaluating the security of voting schemes include applied pi-calculus [5, 20, 29] , process algebra [39] , k-resilience terms [43] , a taxonomy of di erent levels of security requirements [35] or a formal model based on the Common Criteria Protection Pro le [22] . ese approaches have been applied to evaluate various voting schemes [3, 20, 30, 43] . In particular, the formal security analysis of Helios has been the topic of [8, 15, 30, 35] .
A number of formal de nitions for receipt-freeness in electronic voting have been proposed. A game-based de nition by Kiayias et al [28] ensures, that the voters do not not get any information from the voting system that can serve as a receipt.
eir de nition, however, excludes the scenarios where the voters obtain a receipt by following the instructions of the adversary. Cortier et al. [10, 13] provide another game-based de nition, which, however, does not consider counter-strategies available to the voter. e simulation-based de nition of Moran et al. in [40] , as well as the de nition in [32] based on epistemic logic, on the contrary, allow the voter to apply counter-strategies to fake her receipts. Further symbolic de nitions of receipt-freeness include [5, 20, 25, 32, 40] (see also an overview of such de nitions in [38] ), and a framework for expressing the existing de nitions of receipt-freeness in the modal logics of strategic ability method has been proposed in [46] .
For now, participation privacy electronic voting has not been in the focus of research on formal security proofs. Hence, although the de nitions of vote privacy (see e.g. an overview of such de nitions in [8] ) can be adjusted to address participation privacy, no formal de nitions of this requirement have been proposed speci cally.
Various modi cations of Helios have been proposed, xing its vulnerabilities [9] , introducing new security properties such as receipt-freeness [13] , long-term privacy [21] or veri ability against malicious bulletin board [15] or proposing alternatives to the verication mechanism [23] . Other research focused on improving the usability of Helios [27, 41] .
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed a probabilistic abstract de nition of (δ, k)-participation privacy, with δ representing the adversarial advantage in distinguishing whether a particular honest voter has cast up to k ballots in the election. We also proposed a probabilistic abstract de nition of δ -receipt-freeness for voting schemes based on deniable vote updating. We used both of these de nitions to evaluate the security of the KTV-Helios extension proposed in [31] .
We plan to extend the proofs in this paper for the case where the tabulation teller is implemented in a distributed way. We further plan to address the existing security and e ciency issues of KTVHelios, such as the possibility of board ooding and the necessity of trusting the device that holds the private signing key for integrity.
